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I. IntroDuCtIon
On one reading, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has triumphed in its closing days. In 2011, it completed its most high-profile Croatian trial, against General Ante Gotovina, caught Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić, and soon afterwards Goran Hadžić, the tribunal's final indictee at large. The ICTY itself subscribes to such an optimistic reading. In a brochure and on its website, it lists "strengthening the rule of law," "establishing the facts," "giving victims a voice," and "bringing justice to the victims," not among its aims but among its achievements.
1 The $300 million 2 per annum budget of the ICTY is justified by the claim that it "is an investment in the peace and future of south-eastern Europe." Former president of the court Antonio Cassese has asserted that:
Justice is an indispensable ingredient of the process of national reconciliation. It is essential to the restoration of peaceful and normal relations between people who have lived under a reign of terror. It breaks the cycle of violence, hatred and extra-judicial retribution. Thus peace and justice go hand in hand. 3 Social scientists who have set out to test such claims have come to rather different conclusions. Public opinion surveys and qualitative research in the former Yugoslavia consistently show either outright hostility or disappointment as the dominant attitudes towards the tribunal. 4 Scholars have argued that the ICTY has not done enough to reach out to the societies for which it adjudicates, 5 that it did not do enough to counter negative propaganda in the local press, 6 and that it may have distorted an otherwise smooth political transition. 7 Other international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court have encountered very similar criticisms. 8 When one takes a step back from these debates, a prior question arises. The question pursued here is not: "How well have international criminal tribunals succeeded in fulfilling socio-political aims such as providing a historical record, restoring the rule of law, giving justice to victims, or reconciling communities?" Instead, it is: "How are international criminal tribunals supposed to fulfill such aims?" In other words, through what kind of mechanisms are international criminal courts are supposed to reach such goals? The mechanisms through which international criminal courts can disseminate certain values and contribute to a better society have largely been neglected in the literature on transitional justice. And, as seen above, international criminal courts assert that they realize certain sociopolitical objectives through trial justice without a clear explanation of how they are realizing these effects. This article aims to address a part of this important question. 9 Moreover, while the legal literature on international criminal courts neglects political context, the social science literature curiously neglects detailed analysis of what happens inside the courtroom. 10 More particularly, it has failed to attribute effects to the role of the defendant in the courtroom, despite the fact that the trials of high-profile defendants like Slobodan Milosevic, Charles Taylor, Radovan Karadžić, and now Kenyan presidential candidates Kenyatta and Ruto have been very much in the media spotlights. The (lack of) sociopolitical effectiveness of international criminal courts cannot be explained without also considering what happens in court during the trial.
In an attempt to theoretically link what happens inside the courtroom in international criminal trials to their potential effects outside, this article utilizes the theory of legal expressivism, which Amann and Drumbl have applied to international criminal courts. 11 Drumbl holds that international criminal trials can be seen as educational dramas, which disseminate norms and values to audiences. Subsequently, a discourse analysis is undertaken of court transcripts in the trial of Radovan Karadžić, as a point of departure for investigating the expressivist claims. The aim is to arrive at a more elaborate and nuanced theory of the expressivist potential of international criminal trials.
The Karadžić trial lends itself particularly well to this purpose: he is arguably the highest profile defendant after Milosevic, who died in detention before a sentence could be reached. And, like Milosevic, he is conducting his own defense. His trial, along with that of Ratko Mladić, is also one of the last before the ICTY will close its doors. At the time of writing, the trial is still ongoing. On the one hand, this provides a challenge, as the discourses examined could be considered incomplete until the end of the trial. On the other hand, that can be considered an advantage, because it focuses attention on the dynamic nature of the discursive battles in court. These court battles typically take many years before the verdict, on which legal scholars almost exclusively focus, is reached. This article's contention is that international criminal trials begin to express messages to audiences long before the verdict is out.
In the next section, the theoretical framework will be discussed at greater length, and the article will delineate how a discourse analysis of prosecutor and defense speeches can contribute to formulating a more sophisticated version of the expressivist theory. In section three, the type of discourse analysis, and the manner in which it was undertaken, is outlined. In section four the discourses of Karadžić, himself, and the prosecution on the nature of the Bosnian war and Karadžić's role in it are discussed and compared. Section five examines the discourses on the purposes and legitimacy of the trial itself. Section six revisits the extent to which expressivism can help specify whether or how international criminal trials are supposed to achieve sociopolitical aims.
II. theoretICAl PoInts of DePArture
A previous project comparing the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the ICTY has applied Buchanan and Keohane's distinction between normative and sociological legitimacy to international criminal courts.
12 Whilst normative legitimacy relies on purposes that the courts have, including backward-looking ones such as retribution, accountability and truth-telling, or forward-looking ones including preventive or reconciliation effects, sociological legitimacy Vol. 35 724 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY relies on consent. Whose consent is considered the primary referent of sociological legitimacy depends on theoretical points of departure: powerful actors in international politics, global publics, affected communities and victims have all been studied as such. While many acknowledge the interconnection between normative and sociological legitimacy of international criminal courts, the "expressivist" doctrine provides a rare tool to theorize this connection. Expressivism is a theory originating from normative legal theory, concerned with the function of law. 13 It is, however, not a uniform approach. One branch of expressivism, following Durkheim, holds that the law simply is an expression of dominant moral attitudes in society. This conception of expressivism is not used in this article.
14 Another group of theorists hold that the law can be used to transform these moral attitudes, 15 as a sociological claim, and a third group argues that this should be the function of the law, 16 which is a normative claim. As Sunstein points out, expressivists are interested in "how legal 'statements' might be designed to change social norms." 17 This article is interested in applying the second, empirical application of expressivism, but with an eye to the third, normative claim: the research is informed by the conviction that international criminal tribunals should attempt to have beneficial effects on societies in transition.
Many theorists working on expressivism are mainly concerned with the expressive value of the law, 18 or of punishment; 19 instead, this article focuses on the expressivist potential of the trial itself, which according to one classic account can be seen as a "status degradation ceremon [ Trials can educate the public through the spectacle of theatre-there is, after all, pedagogical value to performance and communicative value to dramaturgy. This performance is made all the more weighty by the reality that, coincident with the closing act, comes the infliction of shame, sanction and stigma upon the antagonists.
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Drumbl describes a mechanism through which, according to his assertion, international criminal trials are achieving sociopolitical aims. Amann, Drumbl and other expressivists give similar accounts of the typical content of the messages that can be conveyed by international criminal trials.
First and foremost, trials are "a forum for making a historical record;"
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"a central goal [is] the crafting of historical narratives, their authentication as truths, and their pedagogical dissemination to the public." 26 Second, they "individuate guilt. They name identifiable individuals as criminals, rather than all members of a group. That individuation may help reconstruction by removing guilt from others."
27 This is also a function the ICTY has claimed to achieve. 28 Third, the trial provides "a forum for enunciating societal condemnation of atrocities," 29 or more harshly, in the language of Drumbl quoted above, for inflicting shame and stigma on the perpetrators of massive crimes. Between them, establishment of the truth, individuation of guilt, and disapproval and stigmatization contribute to the general expressivist aim of 21. Amann, supra note 11, at 169 norm-dissemination, strengthening the rule of law by invoking it. Finally, through the restoration of the rule of law, international criminal trials could conceivably contribute to reconciliation between communities. As seen above, Cassese has made this claim for the ICTY.
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Drumbl's theatrical metaphor can be a useful one for understanding how international criminal trials may achieve social aims. The comparison of important trials to theatrical spectacle-courtroom drama-is a common one, and particularly appropriate to high-profile cases like that of Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milosevic, Charles Taylor, Jean-Pierre Bemba, and Laurent Gbagbo. But Drumbl's metaphor needs further elaboration in at least three respects. First, it overlooks one of the main ingredients of a drama: actors. More particularly, the role of the defendant is treated as a passive one. Our expectation, on the contrary, is that defendants may use the stage to destabilize the authentication of historical narratives, the individuation of guilt, and the infliction of shame and stigma that are supposed to follow. Second, there is the matter of audiences. Drumbl recognizes that the "didactic value of international proceedings is not preordained," yet asserts that the expressivist function can and must be simultaneously achieved across different audiences, including "a global audience" as well as "the audience that matters more than any other-namely, directly afflicted populations." 31 Finally, in the transposition of expressivism from domestic to international criminal law, one important aspect may be missed: the extent to which, due to the new and precarious nature of international criminal institutions, and the political nature of the crimes themselves, the courts and their trials are themselves contentious, or to stretch a metaphor, on trial, and the role this contention plays within the trial discourses.
The intention of the remainder of this article is not to test current support for the ICTY or the Karadžić case with all, or indeed any, of its potential audiences. Instead, the article examines how legitimacy is constructed and challenged in the discourses of the prosecution and the defense in the Karadžić trial. In doing so, the article seeks to establish to what extent what is said and done in the Karadžić trial confirms or disrupts the potential expressivist functions of international criminal justice put forward above. The aim is to provide an assessment of the promises and pitfalls of the expressivist account of the functions of international criminal law that draws on, but goes beyond, the Karadžić case. 30 . Id. Amann, on the other hand finds this claim "somewhat breathtaking, and belied by the prolongation of conflict in the Balkans." 31. drumbl, supra note 11, at 175.
III. DIsCourse AnAlysIs
The approach to discourse analysis proposed here draws on critical linguistics and post-structuralism, but has a more functional orientation, focusing on what discourses are designed to accomplish. 32 This approach is less concerned with ways in which social actors are themselves constituted by discourse, but instead concentrates on the constructive use of language, 33 treating texts as organized rhetorically, establishing a particular version of social reality in competition with others. 34 The main method of discourse analysis has been close textual analysis of court transcripts. 35 Court transcripts covering the period from Karadžić's first appearance in July 2008 through July 2011 were studied, covering approximately 15,000 pages. Given that only the discourses of the prosecution and the defendant were of interest, transcripts that dealt primarily with witness statements were excluded, except in cases where the prosecution or defense used these as occasions for more extensive, or in Harris' term "narrative,"
36 statements of their own. 37 This left approximately 30 percent of the transcripts, which were subjected to a close reading. 38 On the basis of this analysis, two master coding frames 39 -one for the prosecution and one for the defense-were created and continually adjusted until theoretical saturation was reached. Additionally, the entire 15,000 pages of transcripts were subjected to certain word searches that emerged from the manual coding as particularly salient. Interviews with Karadžić and press conferences by the chief prosecutor were also analyzed, and visits were made to the Court in order to directly observe the "courtroom drama." 40 The ICTY's chief prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, has only appeared in court once in the Karadžić case, when the defendant had just been ar- Accounts in Trials, 3 discOurse stud. 53, 54 (2001). 37. Since there was a substantial amount of material to analyse from the "direct speech" of the prosecution on the one hand and the defendant and his lawyer on the other hand, we did not analyse whether or to what extent both sides tried to or succeeded in making points indirectly through the questioning of witnesses. 38. About one-third of this material, or 10 percent of the total pages, were read by both authors for intersubjective validation of the analysis and coding. 39. The master frames, too long to reproduce, will be available on our personal website. rested and made his first appearance. Since then, two prosecutors, Alan Tieger and Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff, have led the case and speak in court with more or less equal frequency. Their discourse can be considered as a collective effort without clear distinctions between the two speakers. Both make frequent use of Karadžić's own public and private statements during the war to make their case.
Karadžić represents himself in court, supported by his lawyer Peter Robinson. Robinson, however, plays his role mainly off stage and talks in court only sporadically, and only on legal issues. In analyzing the discourse for the defense, the sole focus is what Karadžić has to say and ask in Court. Like the prosecution, he draws heavily on his own statements and statements made by people who played a part in the peace negotiations to construct a narrative of the conflict that is almost linearly opposed to that of the prosecution.
IV. DIsCourses ConCernIng the WAr AnD the CrImes
In their case before the tribunal, the prosecutors devote particular discursive attention to Karadžić's rhetorical preparation of the Bosnian Serb population for the crimes that were to be committed; his complete and utter control over all Bosnian Serb political and military activity during the war years; his motivations; the terror unleashed on Sarajevo; the brutality of the camps in which Muslims were held as prisoners; and the paradigmatic crime of the Yugoslav conflict, the Srebrenica massacre. Karadžić, on the other hand, gives a historic account in which Serbs are structurally under threat from other groups. He emphasizes the numerical superiority and aggressive intent of the Muslim side, interprets his actions in the light of a collective Serb self-preservation effort, and attributes much of the evidence to Muslim trickery designed to deceive the international community. The section below demonstrates the way the discourses mirror each other by structuring the material according to Burke's five key terms in dramatism, applied to case construction in criminal trials by Bennett and Feldmann. feldman, recOnstructing reality in the cOurtrOOm: justice and judgement in american culture 62-63, 96-98 (1981) . Naturally we recognize that this particular organization of the material is not inevitable, but constitutes an interpretive choice on our part.
Before the war, Sarajevo had a population of approximately half a million inhabitants, a rich cosmopolitan mixture of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims as well as people who chose to identify themselves simply as Yugoslavs . . . its people shared a genuine sense of community which transcended ethnic lines and which was reflected in their everyday lives. Citizens of different ethnicities intermingled freely. They intermarried at an unusually high rate. They visited on each other's holidays, regarded each other as simply neighbours. In short, Sarajevo was the embodiment of a multi-ethnic Bosnia and the embodiment of its ethnic diversity.
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Radovan Karadžić is responsible for the destruction of this idyll. Against this sketch of Bosnia before the war, Karadžić paints a grimmer picture against the background of the conflict, as he understands it, in Bosnia Herzegovina. Because the Serbian people in Bosnia have lived on the borders of Europe for centuries, they were the ones protecting Europe from Muslim invasion. For a long time, the Serbs of Bosnia had to live on under Ottoman rule.
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Serbian culture was oppressed: in "Turkish times we were a docile people, suffering and trying to preserve their culture through 500 years of unbearable conditions." 44 The peoples living in Bosnia today are all Serbs, but many were "converted to Islam against their own will." 45 According to Karadžić, the fascist Croatian Ustashas committed genocide against the Serbian people of Bosnia During World War II. 46 It is only because of this genocide that the Bosnian Serbs are no longer a majority in Bosnia: "they were reduced because of the genocide during World War II. Otherwise, they were always a majority population before."
47 The Ustashas, "according to the [Simon] Wiesenthal centre, killed 500,000 Serbs, expelled 250,000 and the others were converted." 48 But not only the Croats were associated with Nazi regime: the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, "Hitler's friend," 49 Izetbegović plays a central role in Karadžić's discourse on this period too. Izetbegović's manifesto, Islamic Declaration, published in 1969, is cited extensively: "there can be neither peace nor co-existence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions,"
53 and "Muslims must be superior to all others, and every effort should be made to create an environment in which everyone will be of pure Muslim blood."
54 Karadžić asks a witness: "Do you agree that that is hate speech, even speech based on racism?" 55 Bosnia, in Karadžić's competing narrative, was not an idyllic multi-ethnic country but a historic battleground with ever-lingering tensions between ethnic groups and with an ever-lingering danger of Serb oppression by radical Muslims. Karadžić, in his view, cannot be held responsible for the destruction of the Bosnian multi-ethnic idyll because there never was such a Bosnia.
In the prosecution's version, Karadžić made discursive preparations for ethnic cleansing with speeches in which he used various metaphors to demonstrate that Serbs could not live together with Muslims in particular, or at least not without losing their own identity: they were like "dogs and cats" or "incompatible plants." 56 The prosecutor's version of Karadžić's speeches in the early 1990s is largely consistent with Karadžić's own account of the history of ethnic relations in court: both Muslims and Croats were historic enemies. Muslims were "Turks" 57 and fundamentalists 58 seeking to overwhelm Serbs through their birthrate, 59 whereas Croats were Ustasha, World War II fascists. 60 The dissemination of these views by Karadžić is not just inferred by the prosecutors, but peppered with quotations from Karadžić's speeches before and during the war. 61 The prosecution gives far more extensive attention to Karadžić's characterization of, and relation to, the Muslim population and leadership than to the Croats.
Karadžić, however, points not to his own activities, but to the Bosnian Muslim leadership as the aggressor and the criminal group in the Bosnian conflict. When Yugoslavia collapsed, the Muslim leadership, headed still by Alija Izetbegović, saw this as an opportunity to realize the old dream of a Muslim dominated Bosnia: "100 percent power, just as it was in the days of the Ottoman empire." 62 Karadžić presents an enemy driven by religious extremism and lust for power, who "sought an Islamic state." 63 The Muslim leadership, Karadžić posits, found its inspiration in the Iranian revolution. 64 These fundamentalist Muslims identified "Serbs as the enemies" 65 or at best as "guests" 66 who did not belong in Bosnia. They embarked on a holy war to gain control of Bosnia: "This is a new mentality, the mentality of Jihad." 67 The accomplishment of the Muslim goal of dominating Bosnia, in "[a] community which is religiously and politically so profoundly mixed," according to Karadžić 
B. Actor and Agency: Architect or Victim
Prosecutor Alan Tieger sketches the "receptive audience" Karadžić had for his speeches. He even quotes from two other Bosnian Serb politicians, whose utterances appear considerably more radical than those of Karadžić: Muslims are "foul non-Christians who have befouled this soil of ours" 76 who "had in mind . . . to gouge out our eyes and carve us up, hack our bodies to pieces, rape women and girls in front of their dearest, to circumcise, to destroy our religion, to crush us."
77 Nonetheless, Tieger portrays Karadžić as the ultimate driver of this propagandistic discourse rather than just one of its mouthpieces. Karadžić himself is not actually driven by ethnic hatred towards Muslims or Croats himself, but by a strategic vision. "This case, Your Honours," Tieger tells the judges and the global community, "is about that supreme commander, a man who harnessed the forces of nationalism, hatred, and fear to implement his vision of an ethnically separated Bosnia: Radovan Karadžić."
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As in other high-profile trials of political leaders, one of the challenges for the prosecution is to prove that the suspect had individual criminal responsibility for crimes that were physically perpetrated much lower down the chain of command. Although Karadžić is charged with a set of joint criminal enterprises (JCEs) committed in concert with others, the prosecution portrays him as the grand mastermind behind each plan, with Milosevic as a background aider and abettor and other Bosnian Serbs as implementers. Based on a phrase used in an intercepted telephone conversation with Milosevic in October 1991, Karadžić is described as having undertaken a series of "calculated steps" 79 to implement six "strategic objectives," 80 the first and foremost of which was ethnic separation.
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In implementing these objectives, Karadžić's control over Bosnian Serbs is said to have been absolute. Other bodies of the Bosnian Serb polity are described in mechanical terms. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) was "a powerful machine with President Karadžić at its helm," 82 the Bosnian Serb Assembly was a "valuable instrument," 83 Again, Karadžić paints a different picture of the period leading up to the war. He maintains that he was not planning the war, that he was not an architect, but that he and the Bosnian Serb leadership did all it could to cooperate with, and make concessions to the Muslim leadership: "Thanks to the Serb's flexibility and numerous concessions that they made, there were several solutions that could have provided the avoidance of war and the price of war."
95 Karadžić "always advocated peace and peaceful solutions, never, ever advocating war." 96 The Serbs wanted to live with Muslims, but they "didn't want to live under Muslims." According to Karadžić, the Muslims had been preparing for war for months by transforming the police into a criminal partisan army, organizing religious paramilitary groupings called "Mosque Doves" and a "Mujahedin" division led by clergymen, 100 acquiring arms, and calling for general "mobilization."
101 By undermining peace and by refusing to compromise their goal of "100% in 100% of Bosnia" the Muslims provoked war because that was the only option "Serbs do not accept."
102 This "was the main cause of the war." 103 As a result, the Muslim forces were more dangerous and stronger than the Serbs. The Serbs where "dealing with a raging bull, but the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor] claim that they were dealing with lambs and causing lambs irreparable harm." 104 There was a "vast disproportion in manpower[:]" 105 the Serbs were "outnumbered" 106 by the Muslim army, which was "three times stronger." 107 The Muslim army was well armed and well prepared because they inherited arms from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), 108 and because everybody had weapons at home, due to Tito's doctrine of the "armed people." 109 Moreover, "they received weapons from Iran (with the knowledge of the United States) continuously through Croatian territory." 110 The accusation of backing from Iran is especially significant given that Karadžić alleges Izetbegović wanted to model Bosnia on theocratic Iran and because Iran, as part of the "axis of evil," has often been accused of supporting Islamist organizations abroad.
Finally, the outbreak of conflict in Yugoslavia, and the brutality of it, had long been considered inevitable by western observers: "even while Joseph Broz Tito was still alive, had they foreseen the outbreak of war and the brutality of war. . . . If you're going to have war in the Balkans . . . you're going to have brother killing brother. How then can the Prosecution place the responsibilities for the outbreak of a civil war which the Western governments and the western services envisaged in this almost clairvoyant way, far before they had ever heard of Karadžić and the SDS, how can they link it to this accused here, and burden him and accuse him of being responsible for that?" 111 Karadžić portrays himself not so much a political leader but as a Christlike figure for the Serbian people: "They said Karadžić was the ultimate leader. If they knew the Serbian people properly, they would have said that Karadžić was the ultimate servant of his people, and this is what you can find in-in the Gospels."
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C. Purpose: living space or self-Protection
As suggested above, and somewhat in contradiction to his representation in the international media, the prosecution does not describe Karadžić as having been driven by ethnic hatred per se. His motivation is to provide "living space"
113 for the Serbian people in Bosnia by "carving out" 114 and "conquering" 115 "vast" 116 and "huge" 117 territories. Directed by Karadžić, officials of the party, the police, remnants of the Yugoslav national army, and paramilitary groups were all involved in "liberating the space" 118 for the Serb people. Liberation entailed making the territory "pure" 119 through "ethnic cleansing," 120 the signature phrase of the Bosnian conflict. Karadžić's own account paints him as a thorough cosmopolitan: all my business contacts in Sarajevo were mostly with Muslims? I don't want to enumerate them all, not to waste time. The professor who taught me clinical psychiatry was a Muslim, and I chose him. My internal medicine professor was a Croat, Ivan. My dentist, according to my own choice, is Faruk, a Muslim. My lawyers, once again due to my personal choice, are Ekrem and-I know the surname but I'll remember his name too. He was also a Muslim, and I think he originated from Kosovo. That my hairdresser is a Muslim, or barber, and that everything I did in Sarajevo was mostly linked to the Muslims. 121 Karadžić further counters the "living space" sketch of his motivation for the war by, again, placing all agency with his enemies in the conflict. According to Karadžić, the moves of the Muslim leadership forced all the moves of the Serb leadership in Bosnia: "Serb behaviour is a response. It's a reaction. It is impermissible, it is impossible to say that that is intention rather than reaction. The SDA decides what the Serbs are going to do." 122 In Karadžić's view, first there was the establishment of political parties based on ethnicity. 123 Then, the Muslims declared independence without the support of the Serbian minority. As a response, the Serbs declared independence to protect against radical Islamic rule. The only thing the Republika Srpska set out to do was to "protect the Serbian people from their own state, from the police, from the state-sponsored terror of their own country." 124 Sarajevo was not a peaceful city but "a fortress and fulcrum, a military stronghold"
125 that was well armed and full of legitimate targets. 126 
D. Act: Terror and Lies
In its indictment, the prosecution constructs a complex web of Karadžić's crimes and their purposes: he is accused of having taken part in four JCEs, the first of which overarches the other three, and which together constitute two counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and four counts or war crimes, based on factual incidents summarized and categorized in seven schedules. Even after the Judges ordered a substantial reduction in the number of these incidents put forward in evidence, the case remains vast. However, the bulk of the accusations belong to one of four categories: the shelling and sniping of Sarajevo, the forced expulsion and detention of Muslims and Croats from various parts of Bosnia, the Srebrenica massacre, and the taking hostage of United Nations personnel. The last of these four points had been given little attention by the prosecutors during the period under investigation, and will not be discussed here.
The characterization of the Sarajevo campaign by the prosecution is particularly intriguing, as it focuses on a concept that has been center stage in the international political discourse of the last decade, but has not traditionally belonged to the vocabulary of humanitarian or criminal law: terror. 129 According to count nine of the indictment, Karadžić's men committed "crimes of terror," "the primary purpose of which was to spread terror among the civilian population" by means of "shelling and sniping."
130 While also covering some actual incidents of sniping and shelling, the prosecutors devote much attention to describing the "atmosphere of terror" 131 that engulfed the city: "[t]error was the only constant in the otherwise uncertain daily life of these besieged Sarajevans."
132 "Simple daily acts like crossing the street terrified people. under a pervasive sense of terror; exactly what was intended."
134 "This terror attack, Your Honours, virtually killed a living city." 135 Although unlawful killings are also separately charged, making the people of Sarajevo afraid for their lives constitutes a war crime in itself. Even Karadžić's ally Milosevic is said to have "described the earliest bombardments as 'bloody criminal.'" 136 However, instilling fear appears to be just an intermediate purpose. The ultimate aims were "to secure concessions from the Bosnian government and the international community, the interest in exacting revenge, the interest in securing concessions in negotiations to cement gains and to obtain a resolution consistent with the objectives of the Bosnian Serbs."
137 Perhaps surprisingly, the allegation of terror is exclusively reserved for the siege of Sarajevo. The forced expulsion, internment in camps, and other crimes against the non-Serb population are not categorized as terrorizing civilians.
Karadžić also imputes the use of terror to Muslims, but with a twist: the Muslims did not only sow terror, they were also terrorists. The Muslim leadership tried to realize "the implementation of [their] ideology … with both terror and foreign intervention."
138 Serbs were "terrorized" 139 by Muslim forces who undertook "terrorist . . . activities." 140 The Muslims were "organising and preparing terrorist organisations against prominent Serbs." 141 At the beginning of the war "there was terror exercised by the Muslims against the Serbs. There were rapes of young girls on an ethnic basis, and there were killings." 142 Later, it was "terror in Sarajevo . . . it was terrible to be a Serb that night in Sarajevo." 143 Also, in Srebrenica, "there was terrible terror exercised by the Muslims of the area." 144 According to Karadžić, unlike the Muslims: "we [Serbs] do not have a tradition of terrorism, and we are against killing."
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The prosecutors bring forward a host of incidents involving beatings, sexual assaults and other abuse, and instances of killings that happened in the camps where especially male, but sometimes also female, Muslims and Croats were held. Food, water, and sanitary facilities were insufficient or lacking. The prosecutors acknowledge that conditions varied between camps, but they were generally "squalid", 146 "degrading", 147 and "wretched". 148 In short, they dehumanized their inmates: non-Serbs [were] "sent to camps where detainees lived like animals and were abused, raped, and killed."
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These camps "were degrading and typically brutal places situated in such locations as old mines, abandoned factories, old concrete buildings, and the like. In the best of circumstances, detainees existed in dehumanising conditions." 150 However, the purpose of these "concentration camps" 151 was not death: "[t]he ultimate solution . . . would be to exchange the prisoners, that is, send them to Muslim-held areas in exchange for Serbs held by Muslims."
152 The separation process, according to the prosecution, would be completed with the removal of Bosnian Muslims and Croats from Serb territory altogether. Hence, the inhumanity of the camps was not a purpose in itself, but a means to cleanse territories for the Serbs.
The prosecutors' description of Karadžić's responsibility for the massacres at Srebrenica relies on detailed, factual descriptions of killing operations at various sites and construction of Karadžić's knowledge of these based on telephone intercepts. The prosecutors do not require hyperbolic statements to describe an event that already has the status of "one of humanity's dark chapters."
153 "Srebrenica was once simply the name of a small town and municipality in Eastern Bosnia . . . In July 1995, however, Srebrenica achieved worldwide infamy."
154 Instead, more indignation is reserved for Karadžić's partial denial of the massacre and lack of regret 155 than for the act itself. Karadžić is not one of those who out of nationalist fervour may stubbornly or naively claim that Srebrenica never happened . . . when that man [Karadžić] denies what happened, it is because he knows that the truth condemns him. But the living victims, the survivors, the women, elderly, those who were children in Potocari in July 1995, for them there is no question of what happened, only the lasting pain of loss. . . . Their ongoing tragedy, Your Honours, is part of the lasting legacy of the accused's crime and part of the overwhelming evidence that belies his efforts at denial. 156 Thus, Karadžić is emphatically separated from other nationalistic Serbs: his motives for denial are different, instrumental, and altogether more blameworthy.
Karadžić, while not specifically denying that deaths occurred in Srebrenica, accuses the SDA of using "tricks" 157 to provoke foreign intervention: they did terrible things to "their own people" 158 and then blamed Serbs. They could do this because their actions were "deeply founded on a belief, on a philosophy, political philosophy, that the people should suffer a great deal in order to return to Islam." 159 The examples that Karadžić gives range from Muslims firing from hospitals in order to provoke Serb retaliatory fire on the hospital, 160 the Bosniak government storing humanitarian supplies to create scarcity and blame Serbs for not letting through supplies, 161 and shutting down utilities to accuse Serbian forces of cutting them off. 162 They also "fired at their own people" 163 and "staged various dramatic incidents around the city" 164 of Sarajevo. They also planted false evidence against the Serbs-an act Karadžić claims happened twice at the central market in Sarajevo, known as Markale, and in Srebrenica. In Markale "the whole scene was rigged, with dead bodies-already dead bodies planted there." 165 The same effect was reached by accusing the Serbs of killing civilians, whilst "for the entire first year of the war, there were no uniforms, and if the person was killed wearing civilian clothing did not mean that it-he was a civilian." 166 
V. DIsCourses on the trIAl AnD the trIBunAl
Despite the unremittingly contentious status of the ICTY in the Balkans, and the particularly high profile nature of the Karadžić case, the prosecution does not explicitly explain the purpose of the Karadžić case. The unspoken assumption appear to be that the purpose is to establish the facts about the guilt or innocence of Radovan Karadžić with regard to the crimes of which he is accused, and nothing more. The prosecution throughout assumes the legitimacy of the ICTY, and of this particular case. It never engages in defending this legitimacy-neither in court nor in public. In sharp contrast to how well the details of the case are mirrored in both versions of the conflict, there is a discontinuity between the extensive reflections by Karadžić on the nature of the ICTY and the case, and the prosecution's relative silence in this respect. Noting the silence of the prosecution, this article presents and analyzes Karadžić's discourse on the trial's legitimacy.
Initially, Karadžić challenged the legitimacy of the ICTY itself, stating that he is "deeply convinced that this court is representing itself falsely as a court of the international community, whereas it is in fact a court of NATO whose aim is to liquidate me." 167 He points out that: "I will defend myself before this institution as I would defend myself before any natural catastrophe, to which I also deny the right to attack me."
168 However, he quickly stopped questioning the legitimacy of the entire Court, even before the opening speeches were delivered. He did go on to question the ICTY's jurisdiction in his particular case, in the light of an alleged agreement between him and Richard Holbrook, to the effect that he, Karadžić, would disappear from public life and would not be prosecuted for his role in the conflict. 169 He also repeatedly complains about the inequality of arms between himself and the prosecution. His requests and demands for more time and more support are generally granted by the judges or by the appeals chamber, which makes the complaint that the trial is unfair on procedural grounds harder to sustain.
In the early stages of the trial, the prosecution initially displayed considerable irritation with Karadžić's delay tactics, which included first insisting on representing himself, and then refusing to attend court hearings because he did not feel fully prepared:
The accused, while all the way opposing today's start of trial, has used all the legal remedies he had available. . . . In other words, the trial can only start if the accused says it should. . . . Preventing the commencement of trial in this manner would substantially and persistently obstruct the proper and expeditious conduct of this trial.
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Even though Karadžić came around and took up his role as his own defense lawyer, the prosecution occasionally berates him for the manner in which he approaches witnesses, 171 but more often leaves this to the Judges. The occasions on which either the Judges or the prosecution intervene in Karadžić's line of questioning more often pertain to wasting time than to inappropriate behavior, and have diminished over time. Instead, there is more of a sense of the defense, the prosecution, and the Judges engaging in the common enterprise of getting through the trial. By spring 2010, the two parties engaged in out of court talks to agree a full list of documents, 172 a prosecutor thanked Karadžić for his help in locating the appropriate passage in a document, 173 and Karadžić apologized profusely for failing to give notice to the prosecution about the use of a particular document.
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After the initial skirmishes concerning jurisdiction and equality of arms, Karadžić pointed his arrows no longer at the judges, but exclusively at the prosecutors. In Karadžić's view, the prosecutors are "one-sided" 175 and "biased." 176 They are "trying to turn this Tribunal into a disciplinary commission of NATO." 177 The prosecution portrays Karadžić as a "barbarian" 178 important for us, the peoples back there, and also for international justice and international law."
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Karadžić is motivated "first of all, to determine the truth, the truth about our conflict, to determine the truth as I say, and then to defend myself in the second place. I'm not defending myself in actual fact. What I am defending are the people over there who suffered." 189 The trial can be a "vehicle for the truth."
190 This is also the reason why Karadžić emphasizes so vigorously during his first weeks in Court, and later in motions, the importance that everything that happens in Court happens in public, and why he attaches great importance to communication with the press. 191 Moreover, "if I can have a fair trial and bring out the truth, it will be a step towards reconciliation."
192 The "lies" and the "false indictment" are a threat to peace and reconciliation: "how can one hope for reconciliation between the Serbs and Muslims if the Muslims are to believe that the Serbs did this to them?" 193 The truth about Srebrenica is particularly important in this respect:
We have to see what this is going to do to the future and what kind of seed of future hatred and suffering has been sown in this way for our children and grandchildren, . . . saying that Serbs did something that they never did, whoever does that ensures the continuation of further conflict and slaughter. 194 According to Karadžić, his trial is the "last ever opportunity" 195 to discover the truth about events in Srebrenica. In this respect, Karadžić depicts himself as being, once again, on the front line of Bosnia's future: "this trial is my shift on the front lines."
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VI. DIsCourses AnD exPressIVIst effeCts
Legal expressivism as applied to international criminal trials provides a fruitful way of theorizing the potential sociopolitical effects of such trials, because it actually gives an account of the mechanism-messaging and play-staging-through which such effects can be reached. But in order to work not just as a normative, but also as an empirical theory, it requires further development. We have attempted to further the theory by pushing the theatrical metaphor. This article focuses on the actors, particularly on the neglected part of the defendant. What does comparing these two narratives say about the expressivist potential of the trial against Radovan Karadžić, in particular, and of international criminal courts in general? As stated in the introduction, expressivists suggest several different ways in which messages expressed in court can affect society: truth telling, individualizing guilt, inflicting shame and stigma, norm-dissemination, and finally, reconciliation.
A. Truth Telling
The problems truth telling and historical narrative creation present are quite obvious from the discourse analysis. In terms of the theatrical metaphor: classic Hollywood villains often reveal their evil plans to the captured heroand to the public-before they are arrested or killed, making the truth, and the moral of the story, very clear. However, no such moment is expected in court, where not one, but two elaborate, detailed, and internally coherent historical narratives are presented. Karadžić is telling a story of himself as the defender of the Serbs as a historical victim, whereas the prosecution tells a story about how Karadžić bears the primary responsibility for the ethnic crimes in Bosnia. At the end of the trial, judges will come with the version of the story they consider true beyond reasonable doubt, and most likely closer to the story of the prosecution than to that Karadžić. But, observers cannot expect a single strike of the hammer to undo literally years of wellpublicized trial discourses.
What matters most for expressivist messages to have their desired effect is which narrative catches on with relevant audiences, not which narrative is considered true beyond reasonable doubt by the Bench. It is not unlikely that the different narratives presented in court will catch on with different audiences. Although Karadžić never explicitly addresses the Serbian people while on trial, his narrative will certainly resonate better in the Republika Srpska and Serbia. On the other side, the case made by the prosecution, in which Bosniaks figure mostly as victims of Karadžić crimes, will resonate with this group much better.
The ICTY likely will not be able to convince all concerned to support one official version of what happened during the war and proclaim the victory of one narrative over all others. Nonetheless, more modest ways may exist in which the Court might have an impact on truth telling. Fifteen years of ICTY trials may contribute to narrowing down the range of plausible inter-pretations of the conflict. Due to the massive amounts of evidence presented in court over and over again, certain events and atrocities become close to undeniable. 197 To paraphrase Orentlicher, the trials before the ICTY are "shrinking the space for denial." 198 For example, denying that people were killed at Srebrenica is very difficult for anyone to do. Indeed, Karadžić does not deny it, but resorts instead to blurring the distinction between fighters and civilians and turning around the accusation.
B. Individualizing Guilt
The prosecution takes a clear position: the person on trial is Radovan Karadžić and nobody else. The trial is about establishing his role in the conflict. The prosecution presents a powerful case that Karadžić, if not solely responsible, is at least among those most responsible for the crimes that took place in Bosnia. The ICTY lists this as one of its achievements, perhaps more properly understood as one of its aims:
By trying individuals on the basis of their personal responsibility, the ICTY individualises guilt. Leaders and other individuals can no longer hide behind the "nation" or any other group. They have to take responsibility and answer for their own actions. Accordingly, communities are shielded from being labeled as collectively responsible for others' suffering. This can greatly contribute to preventing mutual hatred and promoting the reconciliation process within the war-torn societies of the former Yugoslavia. 199 The prosecution presses this point, and it seems to be the only subject on which it appears to be consciously engaged in expressivist messaging. By emphasizing that "this case . . . is about that supreme commander" 200 before listing his crimes, and by singling Karadžić out as one of the few who can only deny Srebrenica "because he knows that the truth condemns him," 201 the prosecution very clearly sets Karadžić apart from other Serbs.
Karadžić, however, challenges the fact that the trial is about him on several occasions. The trial, in his view, is an attack on the legitimate battle of the Serbs. He does not discuss his personal role and history very elaborately, but focuses on the history and the role of "his people." 202 This is consistent with how he presents himself in court: ascribing little agency to himself and presenting all of his decisions as forced by necessity to protect his people.
C. stigmatization
Another mechanism is stigmatization or the infliction of shame: making a war criminal for all out of a war hero for some. Karadžić is the "man who harnessed the forces of nationalism, hatred, and fear to implement his vision of an ethnically separated Bosnia." 203 Karadžić presents himself as a martyr for his people, hoping to find the truth and working hard for reconciliation in Bosnia Herzegovina. Moreover, because Karadžić is doing his own defense, the interaction between the prosecution and Karadžić becomes lawyerlike. Seen from the public gallery, Karadžić-who is supposed to be stigmatized as a war criminal-turns into a lawyer. 204 In Court, he is mostly polite and obviously an intelligent human being incomparable to the Nazi leadership at Nuremberg who inculpated themselves through spine shivering statements in court. 205 The prosecution is not the only party who can use the stage offered by the ICTY to stigmatize defendants; defendants are offered the same chances. Karadžić denounces the Bosnian leadership as fundamentalist radicals and the prosecution as a party to the conflict, siding with the Muslims, and initially portrays the ICTY itself as a disciplinary court for NATO. The judges give Karadžić considerable leeway in arguing against the ICTY and the prosecution. As we have argued elsewhere, the Judges find themselves in a Catch-22 situation. 206 When they give the defendant considerable space, he may successfully attack the legitimacy of the trial. If they do not offer him that space, they risk giving the appearance that the defendant is not receiving a fair trial, which also undermines the legitimacy of the court. A case in point of how far the Appeals Bench has gone to prevent any doubt about the rights of the accused is Karadžić's successful request for the removal of judge Alphons Orie, whom Karadžić accused of being biased, from the Appeals Chamber. 207 Removing him might send the message that Karadžić was right to complain to at least a certain extent, whereas leaving him on the bench could also have undermined the perceived impartiality of the Court.
D. Norm-Dissemination
This supposed effect of international criminal courts is perhaps best seen as resulting from the combination of the of the other expressivist effects. The trial, by (1) getting at the truth and (2) stigmatizing and punishing those who committed crimes through (3) a fair trial sends some clear moral signals. The trial sends the message that crimes of this nature cannot and will neither go unpunished, nor be resolved through revenge. In this way, the trial presents an alternative modus of conflict resolution. However, for this expressivist potential to be realized, the different elements of the message have to be unambiguously broadcast. As discussed under preceding headings, this is clearly not the case when the defendant rhetorically opposes all three elements.
E. Reconciliation
Perhaps the most ambitious claim made by expressivism is that trials can offer reconciliation to war-torn societies, ending tension and conflict. The first step toward reconciliation is that the different parties agree on a certain version of the conflict and stop blaming each other. Interestingly enough, Karadžić makes this point in the trial, hoping that Bosnian Muslims will stop blaming Serbs for non-existent crimes, demonstrating precisely that having a trial does not necessarily lead to a common understanding of the conflict. If the defendant succeeds, at least to a certain extent, in strengthening the convictions of a substantial part of his own faction that they are being persecuted, that they were the victims of the conflict, and that the court is biased against them, reconciliation cannot be expected. In a polarized society, if the version of the conflict presented by the prosecution is accepted by one group but the other group or groups buy into another version of the conflict and the Court, and feel that they have been delegitimized, stigmatized, and wrongfully punished, tensions might rise rather than drop.
However, a trial could contribute to reconciliation in a more modest way strongly connected to norm-dissemination: by considering the legal spectacle as a public lesson in conflict resolution. Karadžić is forced by the nature of criminal proceedings to tone down and deal with arguments in a certain way. Although Karadžić at first tries to attack the ICTY itself, in the end he is forced to meet the charges in a reasonable, argued way, using legally permissible arguments and evidence. Histrionic diatribes are curtailed and physical violence is unthinkable in the courtroom context. By conducting his own defense, Karadžić actually contributes to the impression that this is a civil, deliberative debate about the past. He helps observers forget that his presence in court is involuntary and ultimately based on force.
VIII.
ConClusIon: the theAtre of JustICe?
A. The Actors
Expressivism sees courts as theatrical spectacles, but it has yet to develop a better theory on the role of the actors, the audience, and the stage in this theatre. The actors here fundamentally disagree on what story and what moral they want to convey to the public. Defendants are not always content with the part implicitly assigned to them by the expressivists, bowing their head in shame and silently awaiting judgment for several years. Instead, Karadžić's trial shows how they may disturb and contest the presentation of what happened during the war, the individualization of guilt, and the legitimacy of the proceeding itself. Moreover, Karadžić's complaints about the legitimacy of the Court and the anti-Serb nature of the case largely go unchallenged by the prosecution, both inside and outside the courtroom. The prosecution only plays the antagonistic game on one of the levels Karadžić challenges them: the matter of his legal responsibility for the crimes. A defendant like Karadžić, on the other hand, paints on a larger canvass: he is concerned with the history of his people and his own place in it. In order for courts to realize their expressivist potential, a more public relations oriented approach by prosecutors as well as judges might be desirable, defending their existence to the public outside the courtroom and making clear what they wish the trial to express. This does not, as one of our commentators put it, entail "hiring George Clooney," 208 but rather recognizing that explaining oneself to an audience beyond fellow jurists is part of the job.
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B. The Audience
As crucial as the authors sending the message are those who are the subject of the expressivist potential of trials: the audience. The most important audience is the population of the society affected by the conflict, although one might hope that other societies get the messages expressed as well. They are the ones who are to be transformed by the proceedings. However, the audience is not a uniform group, but rather consists of different groups with their own backgrounds, experiences, and allegiances. And because there 208 . We wish to thank Daniele Archibugi for this provocative remark, which helped us to better formulate our intent. 209. See Glasius, Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?, supra note 8, at 61-62, 65. is no single message sent out of a court, different stories will resonate with different groups. In Karadžić's case, many Serbs will see their worries and ideas confirmed in what Karadžić says in court, whereas more Croats or Bosniaks might hear the story of the prosecution. In combination with polarized post-conflict politics, the antagonistic nature of criminal trials poses a substantial challenge to realizing expressivist goals.
C. the stage
International criminal courts are not institutions that can take their legitimacy for granted. The manner of their establishment always leaves space, although to different degrees, for an argument that they were imposed on a people, and hence lack democratic legitimacy. The requirement for democratic legitimacy of international criminal courts may be contested on many grounds in legal theory, 210 but such rhetoric may nonetheless be persuasive to broader audiences. Beyond this, for ad hoc courts in particular, further delegitimizing arguments may relate to the relationship between of the establishment of a court and the conflict in question, and may imply bias. Prominent defendants can, and will, use the stage the court offers not only to advance their own case, but also to advance a case against the court itself. If the defendant succeeds in delegitimizing the court in the eyes of some audiences, the entire expressivist potential toward those audiences will be undermined. If the court is not taken seriously, reconciling effects, norm-dissemination, and truth telling cannot succeed.
Although the competition of different narratives is to be expected, and is perhaps essential, in a criminal trial, competing narratives do pose a threat to expressivism. Expressivism is likely to be hindered by the capacity of the defendant to provide an internally coherent alternative narrative about the crimes committed, about his role in it, and about the legitimacy of the proceeding itself. Actors play to different audiences. The prosecution plays first and foremost to the Bench, whereas the defendant may primarily address his compatriots. Two other elements require further research: audiences and their reception of the narratives, and the stage, which unlike in domestic trials cannot be assumed to be uncontested, and which becomes part of the subject matter of the play.
Further research on the elements of actors, audiences, and stage in high profile international criminal trials can provide further guidance on whether the obstacles to expressivism identified above can, under certain circumstances, be overcome, or whether they are structural features. One thing is clear: the messages that the play called "Karadžić at the Yugoslavia Tribunal" is conveying are far from unambiguous, and their expressivist effects cannot be taken for granted.
